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Page 1
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               IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
                                                                           didn't know about, or they chose not to utilize in their
                             NO. 13-11117
                                                                                     What the -- what my friends, who are
                                                                           masquerading as opponents and adversaries, will want you
   PHILIP A. MURPHY, JR.; SANDRA R. NOE; CLAIRE M. PALMER,
  Individually and as Representative of plan participants and plan beneficiaries of Verizon's Pension Plans involuntarily re-classified and treated as transferred into IDEARC's Pension Plans,
                                                                           to do today is go right to this issue of whether this
                                                                            was a settlor function or a fiduciary function. And, of
                                                                            course, they're going to say it was all -- everything
                                     Plaintiffs - Appellants
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                                                                            was a settlor function.
                                                                                     And they don't want you, Judge King, to
   VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INCORPORATED; VERIZON EMPLOYEE
  BENEFITS COMMITTEE; VERIZON PENSION PLAN FOR NEW YORK
AND NEW ENGLAND ASSOCIATES; VERIZON MANAGEMENT PENSION
                                                                        10 rely upon any of your well-reasoned decision that you
AND NEW ENGLAND ASSOCIATES; VERIZON MANAGEMENT PENSION II PLAN; SUPERMEDIA EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMMITTEE, Formerly known as Idearc's Employee Benefits Committee; VERIZON 12 CORPORATE SERVICES GROUP, INCORPORATED; VERIZON ENTERPRISES MANAGEMENT PENSION PLAN; VERIZON PENSION 13 PLAN FOR MID-ATLANTIC ASSOCIATES,
                                                                        made in Boussien [ph]. They'd rather that the Court
                                                                        12 focus attention on whether they complied with Section
                                                                        13 208, which I'll refer to as the "asset allocation
                                     Defendants - Appellees
                                                                            mandate" under ERISA. It says that when you're
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                                                                           transferring assets, you have to transfer sufficient
                                                                           assets in order to make sure that nobody's going to be
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                                                                           harmed by this transaction. But that only has to do
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                                                                            with funding pension benefits.
18
                             Oral Argument
                                                                                     Section 208 is inapplicable for two
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                         September 4, 2014
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                                                                           reasons. First, the facts which are undisputed and set
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                                                                            forth in Docket 81 bear out that -- the fact that there
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                                                                            wasn't even compliance with 208 until five days before
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                                                                            we filed our lawsuit. It was three years and three days
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                                                                           after the spin-off transaction that they finally
   Before KING, GRAVES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
                                                                           transferred the final amount of money, what's called a
                                                             Page 2
                                                                                                                                     Page 4
             JUDGE GRAVES: ...Cause Number 13-11117,
                                                                            "true-up," along with interest to the spin-off entity.
   Murphy versus Verizon Communications.
                                                                           That's fine. That means they complied with 208. They
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             Is Appellant ready to proceed?
                                                                            did what's called the "true-up."
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                                                                                     But 208 by itself is not an end-all. It's
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             MR. KENNEDY: Yes, we are, Your Honor.
             JUDGE GRAVES: Is the Appellee ready to
                                                                           not -- it does not bless the entire transaction. There
                                                                            are other issues that had to be complied with under
   proceed?
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             MR. HUVELLE: Yes, Your Honor.
                                                                           ERISA. 208 did not relieve the fiduciaries of their
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             JUDGE GRAVES: All right. Appellant, you
                                                                            obligation to act so as to promote the best interest of
                                                                            the unwanted retirees.
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    may proceed.
             MR. KENNEDY: May it please the Court.
                                                                                     And 406(b)(2) says: Don't get involved in
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   I'm Curtis Kennedy of Denver, Colorado, and with me
                                                                            such a transaction, because you're under a conflict; you
   today is Robert E. Goodman, Jr., of Dallas, Texas, and
                                                                           should either always advocate for the best interest of
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    we represent the Appellants in this action. They're
                                                                            the plan participants, or, as we see in Boussien, you
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    unwanted retirees who are included in the spin-off
                                                                            should ask someone else to step in, an independent
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    transaction between Verizon and Idearc in the year 2006.
                                                                            fiduciary of the sort.
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                                                                        15
             Now, this Court has already dealt with one
                                                                                     JUDGE GRAVES: But you're talking about
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    case involving this spin-off transaction recently. You
                                                                            the duties of a fiduciary.
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   decided, Judge King, Judge Graves, the US Bank case,
                                                                                     MR. KENNEDY: The duties of a fiduciary.
                                                                        18
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    which was the bankruptcy trustees' claims, which I'll
                                                                        19
                                                                           And the fiduciary --
   refer to as the "creditors' case."
                                                                                     JUDGE GRAVES: But don't we look -- in
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                                                                        20
             And I -- and I hope that that outcome will
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                                                                            determining whether or not there's a fiduciary duty,
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   not infect your decision-making here, because this case
                                                                            don't we look at the function which was being performed?
   involves unique claims under ERISA totally different
                                                                                     MR. KENNEDY: The function that was being
                                                                        23
   than the creditors' claims, and we're going to show you
                                                                            performed here was indeed a fiduciary function because
   evidence that, for one reason or another, the creditors
                                                                           we're talking about the transfer of assets. And the
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transfer didn't get completed until three years later.

So all the while, that meant that they still had

fiduciary obligations.

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But when you're implementing a decision, you -- you just don't divorce yourself from the -- the obligation to continue to do what's in the best interest of the retirees.

There's no doubt that Idearc, from the beginning of this -- planning stages all the way to the end, did not want the retirees. And for good reason. And it - it went all the way up to the top of the chain of command. The CEO of Idearc, Kathy Harless, went to the CEO of Verizon, Ivan Seidenberg, and said: This isn't a really good idea; we don't want the retirees.

And what was the outcome? It was almost male chauvinistic. The CEO of Verizon tells her to stay out of the way; from now on he'll deal with the guys; 17 he'll deal with Andy and Mueller.

And that's what happened. So there was no voice speaking up for the retirees during the implementation of the decision.

And as it turned out, as we point out, there are four groups of retirees that would have been involved in this spin-off. The Court is aware that there's management retirees that were former managers. 1 ignored the plain language and basically rewrote the

statute, as we have pointed out.

It's just about six weeks ago that

Judge Elrod of this Court entered a decision in Tolbert

versus RBC, on July 14. And you read that brief at

Pages 7 and 8, and it looks like, almost verbatim, what

we say: When Congress says something, it means what it

says, and it says what it means.

And every word has to be applied. You cannot ignore the fact that fiduciaries are prohibited from acting in an individual or in any other capacity in 12 a transaction that is adverse to the interests of the plan participants.

JUDGE KING: You have to -- in order to do that, you have to buy into the notion that this was not 15 a settlor decision as opposed to a fiduciary decision.

17 MR. KENNEDY: But the decision, Your Honor, was made when they decided to do the spin-off. What they did subsequently is decide: Well, who's going to be involved in this spin-off? And -- and, you know, it was an evolving situation, and so it's not -- they didn't insulate themselves by saying: Well, we're

The whole point of 406(b)(2) is that these 25 people, the senior officers who are designated the

acting now as in a seller capacity.

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1 There's non-management retirees that are, you know,

2 former collective bargaining employees. And those --

there's two groups. There's -- in each group there's a

group that's under pay status, immediately getting a

5 check, and then there's a group of people who earned a

pension in the future, the deferred vested pensions.

Well, at the last bit of the transaction here, the management deferred pensioners were protected.

They were held back by Verizon. So they - they didn't even treat everybody the same in that regard. They

didn't look out for the best interest when they -- when

they implemented the decision.

The fact of 406(b)(2) is that you just 13 don't put yourself in a position where you can't serve always, foremost, the best interest of the plan participants. 16

And I know the Courts have kind of got lost in the language of 406(b)(2), and sometimes they just don't read the plain language. But the fact is, the Supreme Court has already made a comment about 406(b)(2) long ago, and that was in 1981, the NRLB case versus Amax Coal Company. 22

But somehow in the years since, people --24 courts have made a mistake, and everybody keeps making the same mistake. And the district court below just

fiduciaries of the plan, they shouldn't even be involved in advocating for the settlor.

And why was all this done? What - the 3 reason they stayed true to the settlor is simply for a

short-term gain, to enhance shareholder value. And

that's undisputed, that this -- this wasn't an

arm's-length transaction; it was completely a cram-down.

And we tried to find out all this

information before we got into litigation, and that's

one of our claims, is that, you know, one shouldn't have

11 to go through this expensive protracted effort to find

out what's happened to your pension plan and who's --

who's handling it, what's going on with the funding,

especially when a company is going through bankruptcy.

And so we tried to find out all this

information, and we didn't get it. We were stonewalled.

We found out what we needed to know through the

litigation process. 18

But Ehlmann says, you know, we reserve --20 this Court had reserved for a day to decide under what circumstances, when a special request is made, should 22 you comply with that. Well, this is a case where the Court can take Ehlmann and go -- go forward and say: The company should have provided all this information.

So from -- from the beginning to all the

Page 11 Page 9 investment policy and so on, doesn't that moot that? way through, the Court has seen evidence that the 2 fiduciaries weren't looking out for the plan MR. KENNEDY: No, it doesn't moot that participants. And there was no forewarning. There was because that's going to be a continuing issue. But I -nothing said in the SPD. I'm hoping the Court will -- will see and go back and JUDGE GRAVES: You're not arguing that revisit the Boussien decision and see that this -- it's there was a fiduciary duty in connection with the iust wrong to affirm the -- the court below. decision to spin-off, are you? But there's going to be continuing MR. KENNEDY: The basic decision to do a conflicts with plan participants when they ask for those spin-off was a settlor function. And it's just like in kind of guidelines and --Boussien, we decide we're going to purchase an insurance JUDGE KING: Oh, but you can raise that annuity, that's a decision, but how you implement that 11 question then. I mean, you -- obviously you're looking decision and how you go about choosing the right people 12 for something different before this, you know, deal and -- and whether you use an independent fiduciary, 13 gelled than you were at -- at this point. I mean, those are all fiduciary functions. 14 14 you're -- at some future point. You want it for a And I want to point out, Judge Graves, different reason. your decision in Kohler [ph], which is applicable in MR. KENNEDY: What -- what we wanted to do this case. The reason one of these retirees was so 17 is find out: How did this happen, who was representing blind-sided is that it wasn't a circumstance that was us, and why didn't we know about it, and why weren't we informed -revealed in the SPD and the regulation and the statute. And -- and in Kohler you said that the regulation JUDGE KING: Now, the plans -- the plans 20 requires much greater clar- -- clarity. And -- and that here provide that this can -- they provide for this didn't happen in this instance. 22 possibility --We asked for the investment guidelines, 23 MR. KENNEDY: The plan --23 which were to enable the retirees to know exactly how 24 JUDGE KING: -- implicitly. the money's being managed, make sure it's not being put MR. KENNEDY: Judge King, it applies for 25 Page 12 Page 10 into a Madoff fund, and that was denied to us. 1 mergers and acquisitions, and that's what the retirees were accustomed to. They were -- they were -- they were Well, the other Circuits that have looked at that have said: Those are instruments under which accustomed to the companies getting bigger and better, and all the while it was an improvement. the plan is operated and maintained. We didn't use the JUDGE KING: They permit the transfer of magic word "governed." We did say that there are 5 instruments under which the plan is operated and plan assets and liabilities. 6 maintained. MR. KENNEDY: You know, in my 32 years of 7

maintained.

And -- and I think the Court, in three or four instances, has pulled a rabbit out of the hat and -- and used contentions that weren't even raised by

And we're asking that the Court reverse the judgment for the five central -- central reasons we've argued and remand with instructions.

any of my friends in this action.

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They're trying to jump the gun and say:
Well, we want you to finish up the unfinished business.
They -- they come up with several arguments that weren't even addressed by the trial court below. So they know implicitly that this case wasn't completely resolved by the trial court below.

I'd like to reserve my rest -
JUDGE KING: Let me ask you a question:

If -- if this Court were to affirm on the major issues

here and not --- and then get to the question about

the -- what they --- whether you should have had the

doing ERISA, I've seen a lot of plans that specifically say: You can transfer assets, liabilities, and participants. And this is one of the few where it 11 didn't actually say it. So the Court has said: Implicitly that 12 was allowed. Well, even the Court's decision in that regard, which wasn't even raised by my friends, is not supported by any case law, and it undermines the whole 16 point of ERISA so that the summary plan description 17 inform people about what your rights are, what will 18 happen in the future, and what are circumstances that 19 can come about so that you can plan ahead, and maybe you can even bring about changes, which I've done with other organizations. We didn't get that chance here, Your 22 Honor. Thank you. 23 24 JUDGE KING: Thank you. MR. HUVELLE: May it please the Court. I 25

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am Jeffrey Huvelle for the Verizon Appellees.

2 Mr. Brister will speak on behalf of SuperMedia.

We -- my task here is made easier by the very careful and thoughtful opinion of Judge Fish below.

I'd like to make three points about how ERISA bears on

transactions of this nature.

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25 entitlements.

First of all, ERISA protects plan participants in this kind of transaction in two important respects. ERISA Section 204(g) prohibits any amendment to the plan that decreases the benefit of a participant. And as a practical matter, what that means is that there can be no amendment that changes the formula that restates the obligation to the employee in

terms of what he is entitled in benefits.

Secondly, Section 208 requires that the employee -- that the participant be entitled to the same benefit on a plan termination basis after the transfer of assets and liabilities as before. And that provision 19 is actually much more complicated than it seems on the surface because it implicates ERISA's rules as the plan terminations, which are -- what you are entitled to upon 22 a plan termination depends on how many assets are 23 available. And there are very extensive rules in Section 414 about how you calculate and determine those Page 15

to transfer these assets, who would be the participants

2 in the new plan. So that who was transferred is very

3 much part of the design decision; it's not a fiduciary

decision.

Counsel mentioned the Boussien case where,

6 in terms of administering the assets of a plan, I

think -- I think the facts were that the -- the plan had

a choice of four insurance companies to invest some of

the money. And of course there was a fiduciary

10 responsibility to be careful in reviewing the four

11 possible insurance companies and pick one in a careful

12 manner.

13 But fiduciary duties are functional in 14 nature, and a person is a fiduciary only when they're acting with discretionary authority over the

16 administration and assets of the plan. So that -- the

17 decision here is plainly not -- doesn't implicate

Section 404.

19 JUDGE GRAVES: Does the reservation of 20 rights provision allow an employer to make any amendment to a plan at any time with regard to employee pensions

without violating the notice provisions under 102(b)? MR. HUVELLE: Well, the -- it does allow 23

24 amendments to the -- yeah, it allows amendments to the 25 plan, and it gives employees notice of those amendments.

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But the net effect of it is that where the plan is adequately funded to give everyone a benefit on a plan termination basis before the transfer, they're entitled to it after, which means a certain amount of assets need to be transferred to satisfy that.

And that was done here. There is no dispute that both of these important protections, in terms of what the employee's entitled to and what assets are available in the new plan, were satisfied. In fact, the assets transferred to the new plan amounted to something like 760 million. But on an accounting basis, the plan only needed to be funded up to the level of 600 million. 13

But they're different -- different sets of rules and, in effect, they were satisfied, but the plan was adequately funded as required by ERISA. And there's no dispute here that there's been compliance here with both 204(g) and 204(a).

The second point about ERISA is the point that has been discussed already, the distinction between settlor functions regarding -- to the design of a plan and fiduciary functions. 22

And to respond to the -- the comments by counsel, the record, at 1593, is the plan amendment, which clearly identifies, as part of the design decision And as I said, 204(g) ensures that the benefit is not decreased.

We would maintain that Section 10- -- that

4 the notice provision, or SPD, it only applies in terms of giving people notice of a potential loss or denial of

benefits. And the three plaintiffs have admitted in

response to RFAs that they continued to receive the same

benefit after the transfer as before. And the law

requires that that be done.

So in terms of the notice requirements, 11 it -- they're simply not implicated in our view. Judge Fish found that they were implicated, but they were satisfied by that reservation of -- of rights provision.

14 In terms of the prohibited transaction 15 rule, the -- if you look at the statute, every section, (a)(1), (a)(2), and (b)(1), each one starts: A fiduciary shall not; no fiduciary shall; a fiduciary, with respect to a plan, shall not --

So quite clearly, if you just read the 19 statute, it only applies to fiduciary decisions, doesn't apply to plan design decisions such as what was at issue 22 here.

And the cases are consistent with that. 23 The Lockheed case, Supreme Court case, says that. And then there are cases from the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and

1 Second Circuits, all of which deal with the argument of 2 prohibitive transactions and -- and concluding that that

only restricts fiduciary actions, and therefore, has no

role to play in this kind of transaction because the

decision to do a spin-off simply is not a fiduciary act.

JUDGE KING: I have the impression -- and I haven't looked it up -- that there are now regulations dealing with spin-offs; is that right? I mean --

MR. HUVELLE: There are -- there are very detailed regulations relating to the funding in connection with a spin-off.

JUDGE KING: Yeah.

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MR. HUVELLE: And that is -- and that goes from 208 and the issue of funding it on a planned termination basis. And we reviewed that in some detail in our summary judgment papers. Judge Fish apparently reviewed that entire sequence and the complexity of those regulations and said in his opinion that it was -in terms of repeating those requirements, it was simply too tedious to go into.

JUDGE KING: Yeah, I had that impression, but I -- the reason I asked that is that I can remember from many years ago that this kind of thing would come 24 up, and they -- those regulations didn't exist. They do 25 now. I mean, how --

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elements is you must allege harm.

The Fifth Circuit law is very clear that

where you're alleging harm, speculation's not

sufficient. And here we would contend there's simply no

meaningful allegation that any of the plaintiffs were

harmed by any lack of disclosure in the SPD.

Thank you.

MR. BRISTER: May it please the Court. 8

Scott Brister and David Whittlesey with Andrews Kurth

for SuperMedia Employee Benefits Committee. We're the

managers of the plan into which these folks were

transferred from Verizon.

13 And the novel claim against my client is 14 whether ERISA gives members a right to demand documents

15 from a plan when they have no claim for -- against us

16 for benefits, the documents they want won't help them

17 make a claim for benefits, and the documents, in fact,

give them no rights of any kind.

There is no claim for benefits against us. 19

The past benefits have all been paid. The plans are

21 adequately funded for the future. The investment

22 guidelines they want don't give then any rights because

23 we don't let the plan members say: Well, I -- I don't

24 want to invest in tobacco stocks, or: I don't want you

25 to invest in hedge funds.

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MR. HUVELLE: Well, 26 CFR 1.414(1) is a very extensive set of regulations that deal with the

funding and, again, you know, reflect that both

Congress, in Section 208, and the regulatory authorities

have given very careful attention to these kinds of

transactions, which have to occur as companies such as

those in the telecom industry either acquire new 7

companies, spin-off entities. As their businesses

evolve, so too must their pension plans.

And basically the -- both the -- Congress and the regulators have given considerable thought to how to protect employees in connection with those transactions. And here there's no dispute that there's been compliance with both Section 208 and Section 204(g).

In terms of the SPD issue, as I said, Judge Fish found in -- that there had been no violation because there was adequate disclosure in the reservation of rights. We would argue that, in addition, that obligation is not even triggered because there was no harm, no loss -- no loss or denial of benefits.

There's one additional argument that 22 Judge Fish did not reach, which is the recent Supreme Court case -- or not so recent -- in Amara versus Cigna. It says that to have a disclosure claim, one of the

We don't -- members don't get to pick that. And so what the -- if the invest- -- if they

don't like our investment guidelines, they don't get to

sue us and make us change them. That's what we have

investment managers to do.

I'll spend just a second on why investment guidelines is the only thing that they pleaded and preserved.

It's not enough to plead: We asked for plan-related documents, because we can't tell if that's plausible or not. You're entitled to some plan-related documents and not others. And just saying: I didn't get some plan-related documents, doesn't tell us --

Judge Briars phrase recently in Fifth Third: It doesn't separate the plausible sheep from the meritless goats.

We just -- you've got to be more specific than that. And the only thing that is both pleaded in the complaint and still preserved in their appellate

briefs is investment guidelines. 20 Now, the deal on investment guidelines is this: There's a difference between Section 104 and Section 404 of ERISA; 104 is papers you have to give to members, 404 is performance we expect from managers. Those are two different things. 401 is: You've got to

give them copies of this stuff. 404 is: The managers

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Page 21

1 have to comply with these things.

And they've mixed those two up in the brief against us, because it is true there's a Department of Labor bulletin, and there's some cases that say you have to give investment guidelines, and they're all in cases where somebody's plan lost a bunch of money on a bad investment.

And yes, if you sue -- if Dean Witter loses the plan's money and you want to sue Dean Witter and said: You weren't prudently investing, you may be able to get the investment guidelines to see if Dean Witter was following on them.

But they don't have a claim like that against us. They -- we haven't lost money on investments. We haven't -- this -- this is -- they don't have a claim that: Because of that, we need to see whether you followed the investment plans. We haven't had any bad investment plans.

They -- they've got to go under 104, and 104 does say there's certain documents you have to give people if they request. But it can't be what they say, which is just: Well, if it's any document under which the plan is governed --

Think for a minute. I assume most plans 25 probably have a sexual-harassment policy and a

MR. BRISTER: Right. And that's -- the Kajanik is they wouldn't tell me how to get a rollover.

They wouldn't tell me how to get my benefits. And I

think they have to do that. I think if it's -- I -- I

think that's under -- you could put that under either

404 or 104, because it has to do -- but this is not --

this is not something they have a right to change.

JUDGE GRAVES: We put it under 404 in that case, I think.

MR. BRISTER: Yes. Right. And I -- and I 10 think that's -- I think that's -- if you say: This is 12 hurting my benefits -- you know, 404 says you've got to 13 do -- you've got to: Discharge your duties solely for 14 the members' benefits as a prudent investor with 15 diversification in accordance with the instruments of the governing plan.

So you're saying: I want to make a claim 17 for my benefits, and you won't give me the papers to do that, or: I want to make a claim that you're not being a prudent investor, and you want give me the documents to prove that claim.

I think, under those circumstances, you might be able to get some of these documents. But that's different from 104, because they're not making 25 any of those claims. We haven't breached -- they don't

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Page 24

1 discrimination policy and a

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- being-courteous-to-people-on-the-phone policy. Well,
- now, are those other instruments under which the plan is
- 4 operating? Well, broadly construed, yes. But these
- 5 things are things not only do you have to give a member
- on written request, but you have to set up a document
- repository. Under 404(b)(2) the same things have to be
- put in a box -- document repository so they're available
- for examination by any plan participant.

Well, I mean, if it's just that under --11 if it's everything about operations, then you just -your whole office is the document repository.

I think they're misinterpreting that because it's under (b) -- 404(b) starts with this -both the title and the first line says: Publication of the summary plan descriptions and annual reports shall be made to participants and beneficiaries as follows --1, 2, 3, 4 -- upon written request.

It's describing when you send them summary plan descriptions and annual reports, which of course, are mandated because they're supposed to give people everything they need to know to --- to pursue a claim.

JUDGE HIGGINSON: Can you -- you just have a few minutes. Can you discuss the Kajanik decision a little bit?

- allege we breached any fiduciary duties of any kind.
- They just say this is something you have to give
- everybody. That's a 104 claim, and that ought to be
- reserved for the statutorily required kind of plans.

So in conclusion -- of course, the main

purpose -- all I'm saying is: The main purpose of ERISA

is not producing paper; it's protecting pensions. And

they're not saying: We need this to protect our

pensions. All they say is: We need this so we can use

it against Verizon.

So I agree with you, Your Honor. If 12 there's no claim against Verizon, then the claim against us is moot -- excuse me -- because that's what they wanted the papers for.

JUDGE GRAVES: Thank you.

MR. BRISTER: Thank you.

JUDGE GRAVES: Rebuttal?

MR. KENNEDY: Your Honor, what's been lost 18 in all the discussion is if there's a judicial admission that this whole transaction was imposed upon Idearc, and

we point that out in our appellate briefs.

And the centerpiece of how it was imposed 22 is in the record at Page 2559; that's the CEO-to-CEO discussion. 24

And I want to point out that Section 208

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is not the floor, it does not bless the transaction, and there are no cases that say that 208 excuses everybody

else from complying with the other provisions of the

statute, the 406(b)(2), don't get into a conflict of

interest, and the 404 issues.

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The plan amendment that they want to -this Court to address on the retroactive basis wasn't
even retroactive all the way. They couldn't shoot
straight, because they started transferring assets and
people on November 1. The plan amendment done on
December 22 was made retroactive to Dec- -- to
November 17. So it didn't even cover when they first
acted to -- to transfer assets.

And what the courts have said consistently, when -- you always act as a fiduciary every time you transfer assets, regardless of what you're doing with the assets. That's a fiduciary function.

And in regard to the notice, they want to
point out that the notice is only required when there
might be a loss or denial of benefits. That's not true.
The regulation says that you have to provide notice of
the circumstances that may result in loss, denial,
ineligibility, and offset. That means you get the same
benefits, but maybe they're going to be offset because

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1 pick and choose who goes with it. And if you're doing

2 that, you're managing the assets, and you're -- and

3 you're doing a fiduciary role. You're playing God.

4 You're deciding which of the retirees are going to be

5 linked to the very surplus monies that you're giving

6 away to Idearc. And that's what happened here and

7 that's why we keep saying over and over: It was a

fiduciary function.

And what's been lost in the statute that
was violated, the 406(b)(2) language, the plain words
say that: A fiduciary shall not in his individual or in
any other capacity -- any other capacity --

That means as an officer, as a director, as an agent, as a girlfriend, as anything of --- in a transaction that's adverse to the interest of the retirees. And we've shown that.

This was --- there's -- there's harm all over the field here, and they knew that. They knew that it wasn't in their best interest from the --- from the beginning. And that's because they barely gave enough funding for what the retirees' needs were. They did not give one dollar, one penny to deal with the package of benefits that all these people earned by putting in all their years of service.

All these people at Verizon -- there's

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you're going somewhere else, or maybe you're going into an annuity or a different pension plan.

But there wasn't any such disclosure. But they made sure of that -- they made sure that they put that in their SPDs a year -- within -- close to a year after the retirees were transferred. So, you know, that's an admission that they know it should have been in the SPDs from the get-go.

When dealing with the -- the settlor function here, they cannot insulate their -- everything that happens -- just because they say: Well, now we're going to do a spin-off. What if it takes three years to figure out what's the best thing to do for the people?

When they were choosing to use these assets for the spin-off, as part of the way to enhance the shareholder value, they had to choose which people would go with it. And I could never understand how you can tie people to surplus assets.

Because the Hughes Aircraft decision by
the Supreme Court says: If there's surplus assets, the
plan participants are -- aren't linked to it; they have
no right to complain about what's done with it; they
have no interest in it.

Well, I think that goes both ways. If the company wants to transfer surplus assets, it cannot just

1 100,000 of them -- they've all earned a package. And
2 everyone that's at Verizon still gets the whole package,
3 the life insurance, the welfare benefits, everything
4 that goes with being a --- a good long-term -5 JUDGE KING: That's the basic -6 MR. KENNEDY: -- service employee.
7 JUDGE KING: That's the basic problem from
8 your standpoint, is that because you're not a part of
9 the Verizon plan anymore, you don't get the health
10 benefits and all the rest of it. It's really not about
11 this pension.
12 MR. KENNEDY: That was part of the deal.

MR. KENNEDY: That was part of the deal.
You know, it's one of the terms of the pension plan.
The pension plan says right in -- and that makes it
unique. The pension plan says: If you're eligible for
a service pension, you're eligible for --- you're going
to get all of these other things as well. And we point
out that language in our briefs.

And that --- that's one of the unique things about these Bell System pension plans, is that it did provide right within the pension plan document that you get your health care and welfare benefits.

Verizon hasn't done anything negative to them. And it's one of the richest companies in America, so you've got to wonder why would they get rid of all

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1 these unwanted retirees. It was simply to enhance
   shareholder value, and it was all wrong.
             We ask you to reverse and remand and ---
   and order the trial court, also, to give attorneys' fees
5
   and costs for our efforts.
             Thank you.
             JUDGE GRAVES: Thank you very much.
             The Court will take this matter under
   advisement, issue a ruling...
             (Recording concluded.)
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